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“Economic Substance”: Drawing the Line
Between Legitimate Tax Minimization
and Abusive Tax Avoidance
Jinyan Li*

PRÉCIS

La règle générale anti-évitement (RGAE) de l’article 245 de la Loi de l’impôt sur le
revenu permet de faire la distinction entre la réduction légitime de l’impôt et
l’évitement fiscal abusif. La RGAE ne fournit cependant pas de lignes directrices pour
déterminer si une opération particulière est légitime ou abusive. Dans cet article,
l’auteur fait valoir que la réalité économique est utile pour faire cette distinction. Non
seulement est-elle exigée par le législateur avec l’adoption de la RGAE, mais elle se
justifie également par des motifs théoriques et est compatible avec la méthode
textuelle, contextuelle et téléologique d’interprétation des lois. De plus, l’auteur croit
que la réalité économique est la meilleure méthode pour équilibrer les préoccupations
politiques conflictuelles dans la loi fiscale canadienne. La Cour suprême du Canada a
également reconnu la pertinence de la notion de la réalité économique dans le récent
arrêt Hypothèques Trustco Canada. Cependant, il s’agit d’une notion relativement
nouvelle dans le droit fiscal canadien. Cet article nous permet de mieux la comprendre
en traitant des quatre questions suivantes : 1) Pourquoi l’analyse de la réalité économique
devrait-elle être pertinente dans les causes portant sur la RGAE ? 2) Qu’entend-on par
« réalité économique » ? 3) Quels sont les facteurs pertinents pour déterminer la
réalité économique d’une opération ? 4) Comment appliquer l’analyse de la réalité
économique dans les causes portant sur la RGAE ?

* Of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, and senior researcher at the Policy
Research Institute, Monash University, Melbourne. This article is based on a paper presented
at a symposium held on November 18, 2005 at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law,
“The Supreme Court of Canada and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Tax Avoidance After
Canada Trustco and Mathew.” (For a summary of the symposium proceedings and other commentary
on these cases, see Policy Forum (2005) vol. 53, no. 4 Canadian Tax Journal 1007-52.) I thank
Rick Krever, Daniel Sandler, and the anonymous reviewers for the Canadian Tax Journal for
their comments on the draft of the article. I also thank Chief Justice Donald Bowman, Al Meghji,
and other participants at the GAAR symposium on November 18, 2005 for their insightful
remarks about economic substance in Canadian tax law. My special thanks go to Scott Wilkie,
who has provided much inspiration for this article.
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ABSTRACT

The general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in section 245 of the Income Tax Act is about
drawing a line between legitimate tax minimization and abusive tax avoidance. However,
the GAAR does not provide guidelines for determining whether a particular transaction
is legitimate or abusive. In this article, the author argues that economic substance is a
useful standard for drawing the line. It is not only called for by Parliament through the
enactment of the GAAR; it is also justified on theoretical grounds, and is consistent with
the textual, contextual, and purposive approach to statutory interpretation. Moreover,
the author argues, economic substance is the best method for balancing conflicting
policy concerns in Canadian income tax law. The Supreme Court of Canada also recognized
the relevance of economic substance in the recent Canada Trustco decision. However,
economic substance is a relatively new concept in Canadian tax law. The article advances
our understanding of this concept by addressing four questions: (1) Why should economic
substance analysis be relevant in GAAR cases? (2) What does “economic substance”
mean? (3) What are the relevant factors in determining the economic substance of
transactions? (4) How can an economic substance analysis be applied in GAAR cases?
KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE ■ GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE ■ TAX AVOIDANCE ■
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ■ TAX SHELTERS
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INTRODUCTION
Subsection 245(4) recognizes that the provisions of the Act are intended to apply to
transactions with real economic substance, not to transactions intended to exploit,
misuse or frustrate the Act to avoid tax.1
The GAAR draws a line between legitimate tax minimization and abusive tax avoidance. The line is far from bright.2
While the “economic substance” of the transaction may be relevant at various stages
of the [section 245] analysis, this expression has little meaning in isolation from the
proper interpretation of specific provisions of the Act.3

In enacting the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in section 245 of the Income
Tax Act,4 Parliament recognized, and accepted as a legitimate part of Canadian tax
law, the well-known Duke of Westminster 5 principle—the taxpayer’s right to arrange
his affairs so as to attract the least amount of tax; that is, to engage in tax planning.6
But Parliament drew a distinction between legitimate tax minimization and abusive
tax avoidance. The GAAR was intended to prevent tax planning undertaken solely
for the purpose of exploiting tax law. To the extent that the GAAR applies, “the
Duke of Westminster principle and the emphasis on textual interpretation may be
attenuated.”7 Ultimately, the GAAR “is intended to strike a balance between taxpayers’ need for certainty in planning their affairs and the government’s responsibility
to protect the tax base and the fairness of the tax system.”8
In The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co.9 and Mathew v. The Queen,10 the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled for the first time on the application of the GAAR.
The court was unanimous in holding that the GAAR applied in Mathew but not in
Canada Trustco. The court articulated a textual, contextual, and purposive approach
to statutory interpretation, which should put an end to the traditional textual or

1 Canada, Department of Finance, Explanatory Notes to Legislation Relating to Income Tax (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 1988), clause 186.
2 The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., 2005 SCC 54, at paragraph 16.
3 Ibid., at paragraph 76.
4 RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (herein referred to as “the Act”). Unless otherwise
stated, statutory references in this article are to the Act.
5 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Westminster (Duke), [1936] AC 1 (HL).
6 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 31, quoting the explanatory notes, supra note 1, at
clause 186.
7 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 13.
8 Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Reform 1987: Income Tax Reform (Ottawa: Department of
Finance, June 18, 1987), 130.
9 Supra note 2.
10 2005 SCC 55.
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plain meaning approach, at least in the GAAR context.11 The court also set forth a
number of principles for the application of the GAAR, focusing particularly on
subsection 245(4). The key issue in these two cases was whether an avoidance
transaction constitutes abusive avoidance within the meaning of subsection 245(4).
In interpreting subsection 245(4), the court consolidated the “misuse” and “abuse”
tests into a single “abuse” test. The court stated that a two-part inquiry is required
in order to establish whether an abuse has occurred. The first part of the inquiry is
to interpret the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit in order to determine their
object, spirit, and purpose (collectively referred to as “legislative purpose”). This
statutory interpretation issue is a question of law, guided by the textual, contextual,
and purposive interpretation principle. Once the meaning and legislative purpose
of the statutory provisions are determined, the second part of the inquiry is to
determine whether the avoidance transaction falls within or frustrates that purpose. This stage involves applying the provisions to the facts of the case, and is
described by the court as “necessarily fact-intensive.”12
On the question of economic substance, referred to in the Department of Finance
explanatory notes on the GAAR (quoted above),13 the Supreme Court confirmed
that it may be relevant at various stages of the GAAR analysis. However, the court
made it clear that economic substance cannot be isolated from the factual context
of the case but “must be considered in relation to the proper interpretation of the
specific provisions that are relied upon for the tax benefit.”14
Unfortunately, the court did not provide clear guidelines for drawing the line
between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance. Although it acknowledged the possible relevance of economic substance, the court did not address the
following key questions:

11 In non-tax cases, the Supreme Court has adopted the textual, contextual, and purposive
interpretation as a normative statutory interpretation principle (see, for example, Montreal
(City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, heard at about the time of Canada Trustco). In tax
cases, however, the court seemed to regard this interpretation approach as an “extraordinary”
guide that is not generally applicable in the first instance. It is beyond the scope of this article
to explore the philosophy and psychology that may underlie this distinction. For interesting
commentary, see Neil Brooks, “The Responsibility of Judges in Interpreting Tax Legislation,”
in Graeme S. Cooper, ed., Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications,
1997), 93-129, at 95-96; and Daniel M. Schneider, “Using the Social Background Model To
Explain Who Wins Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the
Taxpayer?” (2005) vol. 25, no. 1 Virginia Tax Review 201-49.
12 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 44. The court reiterated (at paragraph 46) that,
where the two-part inquiry is applied, the determination of abusive tax avoidance “is a question
of fact” and then went on to state, “Provided the Tax Court judge has proceeded on a proper
construction of the provisions of the Act and on findings supported by the evidence, appellate
tribunals should not interfere, absent a palpable and overriding error.”
13 Supra note 1.
14 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 76. See also paragraphs 56-60.
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1. Why should economic substance be relevant in GAAR cases?
2. What does “economic substance” mean?
3. What are the relevant factors in determining the economic substance of
transactions?
4. How can an economic substance analysis be applied in GAAR cases?
Meanwhile, the court evidently does not expect to be asked to hear another GAAR
case in the near future. Lower courts now have the green light to look at the economic
substance of transactions, but they are left without a roadmap for the search. In the
first post-Canada Trustco case, Evans v. The Queen,15 Bowman CJ cited economic
substance as one of the factors in his subsection 245(4) analysis, but struggled with
the meaning of this expression and failed to apply it appropriately.
This article aims at advancing our understanding of economic substance first by
considering the relevance of the concept in the Canada Trustco and Mathew decisions and then by discussing each of the four questions identified above. The
discussion is divided into five parts, summarized as follows:
■

■

■

■

The first part briefly reviews the Supreme Court’s decisions in Canada Trustco
and Mathew.
The second part discusses why the concept of economic substance is relevant
in GAAR cases. I argue that (1) the consideration of economic substance is
called for by Parliament through the enactment of the GAAR; (2) it is consistent with the purposive approach to statutory interpretation; (3) it is justified
on theoretical grounds; and (4) it is the best method for balancing conflicting
policy concerns in Canadian income tax law. Since the Department of Finance
stated specifically that “[s]ubsection 245(4) recognizes that the provisions of
the Act are intended to apply to transactions with real economic substance,”16
it is logical to expect that this concept would play a crucial role in the GAAR
analysis.
The third part examines the meaning of “economic substance.” I maintain that
this concept involves more than “legal substance” and requires one to look at
the economic result or the economic reality of a transaction. It clarifies
whether any economic value or profit (other than tax savings) is expected to
be earned from a transaction, or whether the taxpayer’s financial position is
to be altered in a meaningful way, as a result of the transaction as stipulated
in the legal documentation.
The fourth part discusses the factors that are relevant in determining the
economic substance of transactions—specifically, expected non-tax profit,
exposure to risk and market forces, and the involvement of tax-indifferent
parties or intermediaries.

15 2005 TCC 684.
16 Supra note 1, quoted in Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraphs 48-49.
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The fifth part examines the application of an economic substance analysis in
GAAR cases. I suggest that Canadian courts should embrace economic substance
as a useful analytical tool in applying the GAAR. Even though “economic
reality” is not in favour in recent jurisprudence, the courts have been called
upon to examine all of the relevant facts and circumstances of a case in
certain areas of the law, such as determining what is “reasonable” and what is
a “fair market value.” I refer to both Canadian and foreign jurisprudence to
shed light on the economic analysis of tax-avoidance transactions.

C A N A D A T R U S TC O A N D M A T H E W : E C O N O M I C
S U B S TA N C E M AY B E R E L E V A N T
Canada Trustco
Canada Trustco involved a factually complex but conceptually straightforward type
of leveraged lease. The Supreme Court summarized the facts as follows:
Briefly stated, on December 17, 1996, the respondent, with the use of its own money
and a loan of approximately $100 million from the Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”),
purchased trailers from Transamerica Leasing Inc. (“TLI”) at fair market value of
$120 million. CTMC [Canada Trustco] leased the trailers to Maple Assets Investments
Limited (“MAIL”) who in turn subleased them to TLI, the original owner. TLI then
prepaid all amounts due to MAIL under the sublease. MAIL placed on deposit an amount
equal to the loan for purposes of making the lease payments and a bond was pledged
as security to guarantee a purchase option payment to CTMC at the end of the lease.
These transactions allowed CTMC to substantially minimize its financial risk. They
were also accompanied by financial arrangements with various other parties, not
relevant to this appeal.17

For Canadian tax purposes, Canada Trustco treated the stated cost of the trailers
as their capital cost and deducted capital cost allowance (CCA) in computing its
profit. From the taxpayer’s perspective, “[t]he transaction provides very attractive
returns by generating CCA deductions which can be used to shelter other taxable
lease income generated by Canada Trust.”18 The minister invoked the GAAR in
denying the CCA deductions.19
At the Supreme Court, the Crown argued20 that (1) the object and spirit of the
CCA provisions is “to provide for the recognition of money spent to acquire

17 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 3.
18 Ibid., at paragraph 2.
19 The taxpayer’s appeal to the Tax Court of Canada was upheld (2003 DTC 587; [2003] 4 CTC
2009). The Tax Court’s decision was affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal (2004 DTC
6119; [2004] 2 CTC 276). The minister of national revenue sought leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada, which was granted.
20 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 70.
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qualifying assets to the extent that they are consumed in the income-earning
process”; and (2) the circular sales-leaseback transaction involved “no real risk” and
the taxpayer did not actually spend $120 million to purchase the trailers. Because
the taxpayer created a “cost for CCA purposes that is an illusion” without incurring
any “real” expense, the arrangement contravened the object and purpose of the
CCA provisions and constituted abusive tax avoidance. The Crown’s economic
substance argument was framed as follows:
In this case, the pre-ordained series of transactions misuses and abuses the CCA
regime because it manufactures a cost for CCA purposes that does not represent the
real economic cost to CTMC of the trailers. . . . There was no risk at all that the rent
payments would not be made. Even the $5.9 million that CTMC apparently paid in fees
was fully covered as it, along with the rest of CTMC’s contribution of $24.9 million in
funding, will be reimbursed when the $19 million bond pledged to CTMC matures in
December 2005 at $33.5 million.21

In contrast, as the Supreme Court noted, Canada Trustco relied on the Tax
Court’s conclusion that “the transaction was a profitable commercial investment
and fully consistent with the object and spirit of the Act.”22 Canada Trustco argued
that the policy of the Act is that “cost” means the price (the amount) that the
taxpayer gave up in order to get the asset (except in specific circumstances not
applicable to the case at issue), and that “[a] cost is not reduced to reflect a
mitigation of economic risk.”23 Thus, the transaction was not abusive. Canada
Trustco’s position prevailed.
The Supreme Court found that the purpose of the CCA provisions, as applied to
sale-leaseback transactions, was to permit deduction of CCA based on the cost of
the assets acquired. “This purpose emerges clearly from the scheme of the CCA
provisions within the Act as a whole.”24 The provisions of the Act do not refer to
“economic risk” but only to “cost.”25 Moreover, the court found the Crown’s
submission on “economic substance” to be “narrow”:

21 Ibid. (emphasis added by the court).
22 Ibid., at paragraph 71. This is a factual determination. The Tax Court considered whether, as
an evidentiary matter, the taxpayer had behaved in a fashion that reflected reliance on the legal
formulation and concluded that transactions of this nature are normal commercial transactions.
Since the Supreme Court regarded this as a question of fact, it simply adopted the Tax Court’s
characterization.
23 Ibid., at paragraphs 71 and 72.
24 Ibid., at paragraph 74.
25 The specified leasing property rules implicitly reflect decisions about the economic implications
of certain sale-leaseback transactions. In the context of CCA, cost is a well-understood legal
concept. The court stated, ibid., at paragraph 75, “Like the Tax Court Judge, we see nothing in
the GAAR or the object of the CCA provisions that permits us to rewrite them to interpret
‘cost’ to mean ‘amount economically at risk’ in the applicable provisions.”
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It did not focus on the purpose of the CCA provisions read in the context of the Act as
a whole, to determine whether the tax benefit fell outside the object, spirit or purpose
of the relevant provisions.26

Overall, the Supreme Court’s analysis of subsection 245(4) in the context of this
case is disappointing. A “textual, contextual and purposive” interpretation of the
concept of “cost” was effectively reduced to a mere “textual” interpretation. The
court did not fully examine the broader statutory context of the concept of “cost.”
Nor did the court shed much light on how to establish the legislative purpose of
the CCA provisions; it simply declared that the purpose “emerges clearly from the
scheme of the CCA provisions within the Act as a whole.” To back up its conclusion
that “cost” refers only to “legal” cost, and not to “economic” cost, the court drew a
negative inference from the fact that Parliament introduced economic risk into the
meaning of cost in subsections 13(7.1) and (7.2) of the Act (which adjust the cost of
depreciable property when a taxpayer receives government assistance), but not in
the context of CCA provisions.
With respect to the “factual context” of this case, the court adopted the “legal
substance” analysis of the transactions:
Here the documents detailing the transaction left no uncertainty as to the relationships between the parties. CTMC paid $120 million to TLI for the equipment, partly
with borrowed funds and partly with its own money. Having become the owner of the
equipment, it leased it to MAIL. MAIL then subleased it back to the vendor, TLI. The
relationships between the parties as expressed in the relevant documentation were not
superfluous elements; they were the very essence of the transaction.27

The Supreme Court upheld the Tax Court’s characterization of the transaction
as being “not so dissimilar from an ordinary sale-leaseback [as] to take it outside
the object, spirit or purpose of the relevant CCA provisions.”28 As noted above, the
Supreme Court also relied on the Tax Court’s conclusion that “the transaction was
a profitable commercial investment and fully consistent with the object and spirit
of the Act.” The Supreme Court did not mention the fact that the transaction was
“profitable” only because of the tax savings (CCA deductions and interest expense
deduction). If profit means pre-tax profit, the transaction was not profitable; it was
designed to generate a “loss” in order to shelter the taxpayer’s profit from other
transactions.

Mathew
The Mathew case involved a transfer of business losses from a corporation to unrelated persons through the use of a partnership. Standard Trust Company was in the
26 Ibid., at paragraph 76.
27 Ibid., at paragraph 77.
28 Ibid., at paragraph 78.
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business of lending money on the security of mortgages of real property. As a result
of financial difficulties, Standard Trust was wound up in 1991. Standard Trust’s
assets included a portfolio of mortgage loans (“the STIL II portfolio”) with a total
cost of $85 million and a fair market value of $33 million, and thus accrued losses of
$52 million. These losses were of no value to Standard Trust because of its insolvency. In order to maximize the amount realized by Standard Trust on liquidation,
the liquidator devised a plan to sell the portfolio. The following steps were taken:
1. Standard Trust incorporated a wholly owned subsidiary.
2. Standard Trust entered into a partnership with the subsidiary (“partnership A”). The interests of Standard Trust and its subsidiary in partnership A
were 99 percent and 1 percent respectively.
3. The STIL II portfolio was transferred to partnership A at a cost of $85 million
pursuant to subsection 18(13) of the Act.29
4. The liquidator carried out an intensive campaign to market Standard Trust’s
99 percent interest in partnership A and, after difficult and protracted negotiations, eventually sold it to OSFC Holdings Ltd.
5. OSFC assigned its partnership interest to a general partnership (“partnership B”).
6. OSFC retained an interest in partnership B but sold interests in the partnership
to a number of individuals and entities (the taxpayers in the Mathew case).
On the eventual sale or writedown of the STIL II portfolio, partnership B
allocated the portfolio losses to its partners, including the taxpayers, who
claimed their proportionate shares of the losses as a deduction against their
own incomes.
As a result of these transactions, Standard Trust’s accrued losses of $52 million were
transferred to various arm’s-length taxpayers through the use of subsection 18(13)
and the partnership vehicle.30
A textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of subsection 18(13) and the
partnership rules in section 96 led the Supreme Court to conclude that the purpose
of these provisions is “to prevent a taxpayer who is in the business of lending money
from claiming a loss upon the superficial disposition of a mortgage or similar noncapital property”31—not to facilitate the transfer of losses to arm’s-length persons.

29 By virtue of subsection 18(13) of the Act, the $52 million in accrued losses was disallowed on
the transfer of the portfolio to the partnership; instead, the amount of the losses was added to the
fair market value of the portfolio, resulting in a cost to the partnership of $85 million.
30 The taxpayers in Mathew had a tough case even before they reached the Supreme Court. In
OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 5471; [2001] 4 CTC 82, the Federal Court of
Appeal ruled against the taxpayer and held that the transactions constituted an abuse of the
provisions of the Act read as a whole. In Mathew, not surprisingly, the taxpayers lost at both the
Tax Court (2002 DTC 1637; [2003] 1 CTC 2045) and the Federal Court of Appeal (2003
DTC 5644; [2004] 1 CTC 115).
31 Mathew, supra note 10, at paragraph 53.
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Allowing the appellants to deduct the losses would frustrate this purpose. In other
words, the transaction was not of the type contemplated by Parliament:
A purposive interpretation of the interplay between s. 18(13) and s. 96(1) indicates
that they allow the preservation and sharing of losses on the basis of shared control of
the assets in a common business activity.32

The lack of such common business activity presumably renders the transaction
abusive.
In reaching its decision, the court found the following facts relevant:33
1. The losses originated from the failure of Standard Trust.
2. Partnership A served as a “holding vehicle” for the unrealized losses that
Standard Trust planned from the outset to sell to arm’s-length parties.
3. Partnership B was relatively passive; its purpose was simply to realize and
allocate the tax losses without any other significant activity.
4. Even though the partners of partnership B paid substantial amounts to
acquire their partnership interests and sought to minimize their exposure to
risk, these facts cannot negate the above conclusions.
5. Neither partnership A nor partnership B ever dealt with real property, apart
from the original mortgage portfolio from Standard Trust.
6. Standard Trust was never in a partnership relationship with either OSFC or
any of the taxpayers.
7. The purported non-arm’s-length relationship between partnership A and
Standard Trust was vacuous and artificial.

Shifting Judicial Attitude Toward Economic Analysis?
Prior to the Canada Trustco and Mathew decisions, the Supreme Court did not
generally permit the characterization of a transaction on the basis of its economic
realities.34 Instead, it generally embraced the legal substance doctrine. The legal
substance doctrine was a natural fit with the traditional textual interpretation, under
which both the statute and the taxpayer’s transaction are given a literal construct.
What is puzzling is that after adopting the “modern rule” of statutory interpretation in Stubart Investments 35 (that the provisions of the Act are to be interpreted in
harmony with the object and purpose of the Act), the court remained wedded to a

32 Ibid., at paragraph 62.
33 Ibid., at paragraphs 61 and 62.
34 It was argued that the economic substance concept was not part of Canadian tax law. See Brian J.
Arnold, “Reflections on the Relationship Between Statutory Interpretation and Tax Avoidance,”
in Harry Erlichman, ed., Tax Avoidance in Canada: The General Anti-Avoidance Rule (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2002), 41-81, at 67.
35 Stubart Investments Limited v. The Queen, 84 DTC 6305; [1984] CTC 294 (SCC).
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formalistic construction of taxpayers’ transactions. Although the court noted, in Shell
Canada, that it had “repeatedly held that courts must be sensitive to the economic
realities of a particular transaction, rather than being bound to what first appears to
be its legal form,”36 the following caveat effectively “eviscerated” the economic
substance concept:37
[T]his Court has never held that the economic realities of a situation can be used to
recharacterize a taxpayer’s bona fide relationships. To the contrary, we have held that,
absent a specific provision of the Act to the contrary or a finding that they are a sham,
the taxpayer’s legal relationships must be respected in tax cases.38

Thus, contrary to what Dickson CJ had anticipated in Bronfman Trust, there was
no trend in Canadian tax cases “towards attempting to ascertain the true commercial and practical nature of the taxpayer’s transactions.”39 For that reason, the
Supreme Court’s new stance on economic substance in Canada Trustco could be
viewed as a shift in judicial thinking. The Supreme Court did not dismiss the
relevance of the economic substance concept, and in the following statement in
Mathew, the court seemed to contemplate the possibility that a transaction with
legal substance may nevertheless be found to be abusive under subsection 245(4):
[A]busive tax avoidance may be found where the relationships and transactions as
expressed in the relevant documentation lack a proper basis relative to the object,
spirit or purpose of the provisions that are purported to confer the tax benefit, or
where they are wholly dissimilar to the relationships or transactions that are contemplated by the provisions.40

However, it would be wrong to suggest that the shift in thinking is a fundamental
one, because the court appears to have limited the economic substance analysis to
the GAAR context. In that sense, little has changed since Shell.41 Nevertheless, it is clear
that the economic substance of transactions is potentially relevant in GAAR cases.

Remaining Questions on Economic Substance
There are many questions that remain unanswered after Canada Trustco and Mathew.
The Supreme Court considered the Duke of Westminster principle and the GAAR to
36 Shell Canada Limited v. The Queen et al., 99 DTC 5669; [1999] 4 CTC 313, at paragraph 39 (SCC).
37 Arnold, supra note 34, at 64.
38 Shell Canada, supra note 36, at paragraph 39.
39 The Queen v. Bronfman Trust, 87 DTC 5059, at 5067; [1987] 1 CTC 117, at 128 (SCC).
40 Mathew, supra note 10, at paragraph 31.
41 It is beyond the scope of this article to debate why the economic substance concept should be
relevant to the interpretation of provisions of the Act other than section 245. As a general
proposition, characterization of transactions based on what has actually happened is consistent
with the textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of statutory provisions.
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coexist in Canadian law. Why, then, did that principle save a loss-generating scheme
in Canada Trustco but not a loss-shifting scheme in Mathew? Why did the court go
beyond the statutory language in searching for the object, spirit, and policy in
Mathew but not in Canada Trustco? Could it be that the transaction in Canada Trustco
is similar to an “ordinary business transaction” and the one in Mathew is not? If so,
what are the key features of an ordinary business transaction? Are ordinary business
transactions presumed to be transactions “with real economic substance” and thus
free from the GAAR? If so, why not start with an economic substance analysis in the
first place?42 For that matter, what is meant by “economic substance”?
The following statement suggests that the court itself was not entirely clear as
to what an “economic substance” analysis would entail:
A transaction may be considered to be “artificial” or to “lack substance” with respect to
specific provisions of the Income Tax Act, if allowing a tax benefit would not be consistent
with the object, spirit or purpose of those provisions. We should reject any analysis
under s. 245(4) that depends entirely on “substance” viewed in isolation from the
proper interpretation of specific provisions of the Income Tax Act or the relevant
factual context of a case.43

With respect, there are several problems with this statement. First, a transaction
may be considered to be “artificial” or to “lack substance” on the basis of a legal and
economic analysis, not “with respect to specific provisions of the Income Tax Act.”
Since the question of substance is a factual determination, the court must attempt
to establish “what actually happened.” The tax consequences of transactions without
substance are governed by the provisions of the Act. Second, the statement above
is problematic in light of the language in subsection 245(4), which was recently
amended to remove the “double negative,”44 and which requires the abuse analysis
to be performed with reference to the provisions of the Act read as a whole, not
just the “specific provisions.” Third, surely the court must reject any analysis under
subsection 245(4) that depends entirely on “substance” if the provisions of the Act do
not require a transaction to have economic substance. Finally, the court’s suggestion
that a “substance” analysis could be conducted “in isolation from . . . the relevant
factual context of a case” is simply puzzling.
The unsettled state of the law on where to draw the line between legitimate tax
planning and abusive tax avoidance makes it important to appreciate the relevance
of the economic substance analysis. The discussion that follows addresses the four
key questions identified in the introduction to this article.
42 In Evans, supra note 15, Bowman CJ listed the existence of real economic substance among the
key factors to be considered in determining whether a transaction is abusive. The Evans
decision is discussed later in this article (see the text at note 78 and following).
43 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 60.
44 Subsection 245(4) formerly stated that the GAAR “does not apply to a transaction where it may
reasonably be considered that the transaction would not result” in a misuse or an abuse; the
amended provision states that the GAAR applies “only if it may reasonably be considered. . . .”
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WHY SHOULD ECONOMIC SUB STANCE
B E I M P O R TA N T U N D E R T H E G A A R ?
In this part of the article, I argue that the notion of economic substance is important to the GAAR analysis for four reasons. First, an economic analysis of avoidance
transactions is called for by section 245. Second, it is consistent with the textual,
contextual, and purposive approach to statutory interpretation. Third, it is justifiable
under the “self-defeating” rationale. Fourth, it provides a means of maintaining an
appropriate balance between conflicting policy concerns underlying the Canadian
tax system.
Statutory Requirement Under Section 245
A textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of section 245 leads to one
conclusion: this provision calls for the consideration of economic substance of an
avoidance transaction. The text of subsection 245(4) provides that an avoidance
transaction is subject to the GAAR
only if it may reasonably be considered that the transaction . . . would . . . result
directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of [the Act or another relevant
taxing statute] . . . or . . . in an abuse having regard to those provisions, other than
this section, read as a whole.

Two notable aspects of this text confirm the relevance of the economic substance
doctrine. The first is the reasonableness requirement. The reasonableness inquiry
in Canadian tax law has always been based on an examination of the facts and
circumstances of the case, from the perspective of a reasonable third position. For
example, in determining whether an amount of expense was reasonable under
section 67 of the Act, the court applied the standard of whether a reasonable
businessman, having in mind exactly the same business considerations as the appellant, would have contracted to pay such an amount.45 The second notable aspect of
subsection 245(4) is the emphasis on the result of the transaction. This “suggests
that all the consequences of the transactions—legal, financial, commercial, and
economic—should be considered.”46
The text of subsection 245(5) also clearly requires an economic substance analysis of the avoidance transaction in order to assess the appropriate tax consequences.
More specifically, subsection 245(5) provides that

45 Gabco Ltd. v. MNR, 68 DTC 5210; [1968] CTC 313 (Ex. Ct.); Goldhar Estate v. MNR, 88 DTC
1149; [1988] 1 CTC 2187; Maduke Foods Ltd. v. The Queen, 89 DTC 5458; [1989] 2 CTC 284
(FCTD); and Petro-Canada v. The Queen, 2004 DTC 6329; [2004] 3 CTC 156 (FCA).
46 Brian J. Arnold, “The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (2004)
vol. 52, no. 2 Canadian Tax Journal 488-511, at 507.
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(c) the nature of any payment or other amount may be recharacterized, and
(d) the tax effects that would otherwise result from the application of other
provisions of this Act may be ignored,
in determining the tax consequences to a person as is reasonable in the circumstances in order
to deny a tax benefit that would, but for this section, result, directly or indirectly,
from an avoidance transaction [emphasis added].

The historical context of the enactment of section 245 “confirms that economic
realities must be relevant under subsection 245(4) if the GAAR is to be effective in
preventing abusive tax avoidance.”47 Parliament enacted the GAAR in reaction to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Stubart, which rejected the business purpose test
and refused to examine the economic realities of the taxpayer’s transaction.48 By
overruling the Stubart decision, which had, in turn, rejected the economic reality
and business purpose test that originated in Gregory v. Helvering,49 Parliament
explicitly endorsed a bona fide non-tax purpose test under subsection 245(3). Presumably, the economic substance doctrine, also derived from Gregory v. Helvering,
was implicitly incorporated into subsection 245(4).
The statutory context of section 245 also makes it important to consider economic substance under the abuse analysis pursuant to subsection 245(4). The GAAR
was intended to be a provision of last resort and would apply only to transactions
that otherwise complied with all of the other relevant provisions of the Act. Since
the economic substance of a transaction is generally irrelevant in applying the
provisions of the Act other than section 245, the transactions giving rise to the tax
benefit must be characterized in accordance with their legal form and substance. In
addition, recharacterizing transactions on the basis of economic realities is generally prohibited under subsection 245(3) in determining whether a transaction is an
avoidance transaction. “Accordingly, it is difficult to see how transactions could be
considered to be abusive if the economic substance of what the taxpayer did cannot
be considered.”50
Finally, as the Supreme Court correctly stated in Canada Trustco, “[t]he GAAR’s
purpose is to deny the tax benefits of certain arrangements that comply with a literal
interpretation of the provisions of the Act, but amount to an abuse of the provisions
of the Act.”51 A transaction lacking economic substance is typically arranged for
47 Ibid.
48 The Supreme Court stated in Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 14, “[T]he Court [in
Stubart] also rejected the business purpose test, which would have restricted tax reduction to
transactions with a real business purpose. Instead of the business purpose test, the Court
proposed guidelines to limit unacceptable tax avoidance arrangements. Parliament deemed the
decision in Stubart an inadequate response to the problem and enacted the GAAR.”
49 293 US 465 (1935); aff ’g. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. 2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934) (per Hand J). This
case is discussed below (see the text at note 53 and following).
50 Arnold, supra note 46, at 507.
51 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 16.
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the sole purpose of gaining a tax benefit and does not effect any meaningful change
in the economic position of the taxpayer other than the tax savings. Therefore, an
economic analysis of an avoidance transaction helps determine whether the transaction falls within the GAAR.

Purposive Statutory Interpretation
Whether a transaction should be characterized according to its legal form or its
economic substance is obviously a different question from whether the Act should
be given a textual or purposive interpretation. But the two questions are intimately
related. Under a regime of textual interpretation, the courts are less likely to read
the Act as authorizing an inquiry that goes beyond legal substance. Under a purposive
interpretation, the argument that the Act imposes liability on an economic result
(as opposed to a legal form) becomes more appealing. The economic substance
analysis has a more natural fit with a purposive interpretation of the statute.
Under the Supreme Court’s “textual, contextual and purposive” approach to
statutory interpretation, the textual meaning of a provision of the Act must be
consistent with the context and purpose of the provision. Since (according to the
explanatory notes on the GAAR) “the provisions of the Act are generally intended to
apply to transactions with real economic substance,” transactions lacking real economic substance would prima facie frustrate the legislative purpose. The only
exception is the case where it can reasonably be concluded that such a transaction
is intended to fall outside the GAAR.52
According to judicial experience in the United States, the economic analysis of
transactions is important to a purposive interpretation of taxing statutes. The
origin of the so-called economic substance doctrine (which serves as a judicial antiavoidance rule in the United States) is generally traced to Gregory v. Helvering.53 In
that case, Mrs. Gregory owned all the stock of United Mortgage Corporation
(“United”), which held among its assets 1,000 shares of stock of the Monitor
Securities Corporation (“Monitor”). Mrs. Gregory wanted to liquidate the Monitor shares; however, the proceeds from the sale would be subjected to two levels of
taxation if she simply directed United to sell the Monitor stock and then distribute
the proceeds to her. Consequently, Mrs. Gregory undertook the following sequence
of transactions: (1) a new company was formed; (2) three days later, the Monitor

52 David G. Duff, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the General Anti-Avoidance Rule: Canada
Trustco and Mathew” (2006) vol. 60, no. 2 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 54-71.
53 This case is often cited as the source for “first principles” on the economic substance doctrine
and the business purpose test. See Joseph Isenbergh, “Musings on Form and Substance in
Taxation” (1982) vol. 49, no. 3 University of Chicago Law Review 859-84, at 866; David P. Hariton,
“Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance” (1999) vol. 52, no. 2 The Tax Lawyer 235-73;
Louis Kaplow, “Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis” (1992) vol. 42, no. 3 Duke Law
Journal 557-629, at 573; and Stewart Patton, “Treasury Regulation § 301.6111-2T and the
Economic Substance Doctrine: A Plea for Certainty in the Tax Law” (2002) vol. 39, no. 2
Houston Law Review 499-528, at 509.
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shares were transferred to the new company; (3) the new company was dissolved
within the same week; and (4) the Monitor shares were transferred to Mrs. Gregory
as part of the dissolution, so that she realized a capital gain. Ostensibly, these
transactions met the requirements of a “reorganization” under the Revenue Act of
1928. As such, the transfer of Monitor stock to the new company would be tax-free,
and the subsequent liquidation of the new company would give rise to a capital
gain in the hands of the shareholder who had received the distribution of shares.
The result of the transfer, however, was the same as a simple dividend distribution,
and the commissioner sought to tax it as such. Should the transaction be characterized according to the form or the economic result?
Learned Hand, writing for a panel of judges of great intellectual prestige,54 held
that the transaction conformed to the literal language of the statute, and if it fell
within the language of the statute, it did not matter that the sole purpose was to
avoid tax. However, he opined that the concept of “reorganization” involves doing
something for a business purpose and not solely to avoid tax. He stated:
[I]f what was done here was what was intended by [the statute], it is of no consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of income tax, as it certainly was.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a transaction. . . .
[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a
melody is more than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate
recourse to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create. The
purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in enterprises . . . might wish to
consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract from, their holdings. Such transactions
were not to be considered as “realizing” any profit, because the collective interests
still remained in solution. But the underlying presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an
ephemeral incident, egregious to its prosecution. To dodge the shareholders’ taxes is not
one of the transactions contemplated as corporate “reorganizations.” . . .
[W]e cannot treat as inoperative the transfer of the . . . shares. . . . [T]he transfer
passed title . . . and the taxpayer became a shareholder in the transferee. All these
steps were real, and their only defect was that they were not what the statute means
by a “reorganization.”55

Learned Hand’s reasoning “has left echoes in every corner of the tax law”56 in
the United States and beyond. The italicized words in the quotation above mark the
birth of the economic substance doctrine.57 Mrs. Gregory was denied the benefit of
the objective tax result because the transaction did not change her economic position, apart from the tax benefit, nor did it reflect any facet of the business of United.
54 Isenbergh, supra note 53, at 867. See also Marvin A. Chirelstein, “Learned Hand’s Contribution
to the Law of Tax Avoidance” (1968) vol. 77, no. 3 Yale Law Journal 440-74.
55 Helvering v. Gregory, supra note 49, at 810-11 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added).
56 Isenbergh, supra note 53, at 867.
57 Ibid.
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In other words, the transaction lacked economic substance, and it was not “the
thing which the statute intended.”58

Theoretical Rationale
According to the so-called self-defeating theory of statutory interpretation, the
courts should not presume that Parliament intended to allow taxpayers to defeat its
intention through contrived, artificial transactions.59 In other words, this theory holds
that it is not reasonable to interpret the applicable tax law to be self-defeating.
The self-defeating rationale requires an economic analysis of transactions. Hand J
explained this rationale in the US context as follows:
The Income Tax Act imposes liabilities upon taxpayers based upon their financial transactions, and it is of course true that the payment of the tax is itself a financial transaction.
If, however, the taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not appreciably affect his
beneficial interest except to reduce his tax, the law will disregard it; for we cannot
suppose that it was part of the purpose of the act to provide an escape from the
liabilities that it sought to impose.60

This statement echoes the reasoning behind Canada’s GAAR, which is intended
to reconcile the same tensions. The self-defeating rationale is clearly expressed in
the explanatory notes and recognized by the Supreme Court. In finding that the
GAAR applied in Mathew, the court stated that the “only reasonable conclusion is
that the series of transactions frustrated Parliament’s purpose of confining the
transfer of losses such as these to a non-arm’s length partnership.”61

Balancing Competing Policy Concerns
There appear to be two major sets of competing policy concerns in Canadian tax
law: the taxpayer’s right to engage in tax planning versus the government’s right to
prevent abusive tax avoidance; and the taxpayer’s need for certainty, predictability,
and fairness versus the government’s need to protect the tax base and preserve the
fairness of the tax system as a whole. Economic substance provides a useful standard for determining whether a particular transaction reflects a balance between
these competing concerns.
Legitimate Tax Minimization Versus Abusive Tax Avoidance
As mentioned earlier, the GAAR was intended to draw a line between legitimate tax
minimization and abusive tax avoidance. The question of “legitimacy” is presumably
58 Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 49, at 468 (SC).
59 Robert Thornton Smith, “Business Purpose: The Assault upon the Citadel” (1999) vol. 53, no. 1
The Tax Lawyer 1-34, at 4-6.
60 Gilbert v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 248 F. 2d 399, at 411 (2d Cir. 1957) (Hand J, dissenting).
61 Mathew, supra note 10, at paragraph 62.
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decided on the basis of the expectations, intention, or mind of Parliament as
expressed in the Act; it is not about some notion of “tax morality.”62 For example, if
Parliament intended a tax benefit to be enjoyed in certain situations, a transaction
that takes advantage of the tax benefit is legitimate. On the other hand, if a tax
benefit is obtained in a situation that Parliament did not contemplate, or could not
reasonably be expected to have contemplated, the transaction resulting in the tax
benefit should be considered illegitimate.
How can tax law reconcile the conflicting tensions between legitimate and
illegitimate tax planning? One suggestion is to require that a transaction, to be
respected, must have economic substance or must genuinely involve mixed business and tax motives. Incorporating an economic analysis of avoidance transactions
under the GAAR does not mean that the government or the courts are allowed to
intrude upon transactions involving mixed business and tax motives or consequences.
The GAAR only seeks to challenge transactions for which the sole justification was
the avoidance of taxes. The Supreme Court recognized in Canada Trustco that the
GAAR “attenuates” the right of the taxpayers to engage in tax planning.63 The
degree of attenuation is best determined by reference to the economic substance of
the transaction at issue.

“Certainty, Predictability and Fairness” for the Taxpayer Versus
Protection of the Tax Base and Fairness of the System
As the Supreme Court noted in Canada Trustco, the preservation of “certainty,
predictability and fairness” for individual taxpayers is considered a “basic tenet of
tax law.”64 On the other hand, the GAAR requires the balancing of this set of policy
concerns against the concern for protection of the tax base and the fairness of the
tax system as a whole.
The importance of “certainty and predictability” is often asserted; however, there
has been little analysis of how uncertainty affects taxpayer behaviour or welfare.
Presumably, certainty is necessary in a self-assessment system—people need to be
able to fill out their tax returns. It is important that the “millions of individuals” who
engage in “billions of transactions” be able to file annual tax returns with some
degree of certainty without incurring substantial compliance costs.65 In fact, however, the GAAR cases generally involve situations that do not concern the majority
of taxpayers, and the transactions are well planned and executed on the basis of
professional tax advice. Therefore, the requirement of certainty does not ring true
in GAAR cases. More likely, perhaps, the plea for more certainty and predictability

62 For a fuller discussion of the concept of legitimacy, see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1986).
63 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 13.
64 Ibid., at paragraph 61.
65 David A. Weisbach, “Ten Truths About Tax Shelters” (2002) vol. 55, no. 2 Tax Law Review
215-53, at 248.
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is based on the presumption and the expectation that detailed tax provisions will
provide significant certainty. It may also represent self-interest on the part of tax
professionals to the extent that the ability to provide certain answers makes their
services more valuable.66 On the basis of the available research, however, the
behavioural effect of uncertainty cannot be predicted:
We cannot tell whether the uncertainty has good or bad effects. And we cannot
determine whether reducing the uncertainty is a good or bad idea. It can go either way.
If this is the case, we should have no strong feelings against uncertainty—increasing
uncertainty may hurt, but so may decreasing it.67

“Certainty” is also a relative concept. Absolute certainty is impossible because
taxes are imposed on real business transactions, which cannot always be predicted
by Parliament. In fact, the Act requires line drawing in respect of fundamental
questions, such as whether an economic receipt is from a “source” or a “windfall”
and whether it is on income or capital account. As discussed below, because the
nature of economic analysis is flexible, there are naturally alternative formulations
of the economic substance test and different conclusions may be drawn from similar
facts. That does not mean, however, that the economic substance analysis is inherently “uncertain” or “unpredictable.” It would be unfortunate if Canadian courts
refused to look at economic substance for the sake of promoting “certainty” and
“predictability.”68
More importantly, certainty is not the only basic policy objective and should not
be pursued at any cost. In attempting to provide certainty, the Act includes a great
many rules governing specific types of transactions. Many specific rules create
bright-lines; tax consequences depend entirely on which side of the line the transaction falls. These rules offer tax planners the opportunity to design transactions to
minimize or avoid tax. (An example is the “butterfly” reorganization rules.) In
enacting the GAAR, Parliament expressed its preference for “general principles”
over “specific rules” in dealing with tax avoidance, in order to reduce—to quote
the Supreme Court in Stubart—“[the] action and reaction endlessly produced by
complex, specific tax measures aimed at sophisticated business practices, and the
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., at 249. It is possible, though, that uncertainty affects taxpayers differently depending on
their risk aversion: the aggressive, or risk seeking, may react to uncertainty by taking more
aggressive tax positions, while the meek may be deterred.
68 With respect, the Supreme Court’s following statement in Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at
paragraph 75, should be understood in the context of that case and should not be followed where
the GAAR demands an economic analysis: “Like the Tax Court judge, we see nothing in the
GAAR or the object of the CCA provisions that permits us to rewrite them to interpret ‘cost’
to mean ‘amount economically at risk’ in the applicable provisions. To do so would be to invite
inconsistent results. The result would vary with the degree of risk in each case. This would
offend the goal of the Act to provide sufficient certainty and predictability to permit taxpayers
to intelligently order their affairs.”
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inevitable, professionally-guided and equally specialized taxpayer reaction.”69 It was
contemplated that the uncertainty created by the GAAR should not be so great as to
outweigh its expected benefits. The economic substance standard brings certainty
and predictability to the GAAR analysis because it is an objective test based on the
commercial reality of the business world. It ensures that ordinary business transactions are not affected by the GAAR. As in any other line-drawing exercise, however,
an element of uncertainty is expected.
“Fairness” is a fundamental notion of tax policy. It certainly encompasses fair
treatment of individual taxpayers. But more importantly, fairness refers to fair treatment of taxpayers as a whole. In introducing the new anti-avoidance provisions, the
government made it clear that the GAAR “is an essential element in protecting the
expanded tax base against further erosion and stabilizing income tax revenues” and
that “equity requires that firm measures be taken to block sophisticated strategies
designed to yield tax advantages that were not intended by Parliament.”70 Dickson CJ
remarked in Bronfman Trust:
Assessment of taxpayers’ transactions with an eye to commercial and economic realities,
rather than juristic classification of form, may help to avoid the inequity of tax liability
being dependent upon the taxpayer’s sophistication at manipulating a sequence of
events to achieve a patina of compliance with the apparent prerequisites for a tax
deduction.71

Much earlier, expressing a similar concern, the Carter report referred to
the sense of injustice and inequity which tax avoidance raises in the breasts of those
unable or unwilling to profit by it. Opportunities of tax avoidance are not equal, for it
clearly has little practical meaning to salaried and wage-earning taxpayers from whom
tax is deducted at source. . . .
A taxpayer who uses devices and schemes to minimize the tax that he should pay
reduces his tax burden unfairly and shifts the avoided tax to other taxpayers. There is
little information available as to how much of the tax burden is shifted through tax
avoidance devices.72

The fairness principle requires one to examine the objective aspects of a deal,
whether simple or complex. This seems only fair. Most transactions are very sophisticated and complex. Through economic analysis, the courts have the means to examine
transactions and opine on whether taxpayers have crossed the threshold separating

69 Stubart, supra note 35, at 6324; 317.
70 Canada, Department of Finance, Supplementary Information Relating to Tax Reform Measures
(Ottawa: Department of Finance, December 16, 1987), 99.
71 Supra note 39, at 5067; 128.
72 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, vol. 3 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967),
appendix A, at 542.
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intelligent tax planning from improper tax avoidance. The economic substance
analysis also respects the fact that transactions with similar economic consequences
are taxed similarly, thereby avoiding tax distortions.

W H A T D O E S “ E C O N O M I C S U B S TA N C E ” M E A N ?
The Supreme Court mentioned in Canada Trustco that “the expression economic
substance may be open to different interpretations.”73 What are these interpretations?
Does “economic substance” mean anything more than “legal substance”? If so, in
what sense, and how is economic substance related to legal substance?
“Legal Substance” Versus “Economic Substance”
The explanatory notes on the GAAR referred to “real economic substance,” presumably to emphasize that the inquiry is an economic one. The economic substance
standard requires an examination of taxpayers’ transactions “from a similar perspective that Wall Street uses—economic analysis”74 (or, as we would say in Canada,
Bay Street). It should be made clear that “economic substance” refers to substance
other than tax savings. It may be true that for some businesses, there is little, if any,
meaningful difference between an improvement in financial performance achieved
by cutting operating expense and one that results from reducing taxes. Economic
substance in the context of a GAAR analysis does not encompass changes effected by
pure tax-saving measures.
In most cases, commercial reality is defined by the legal rights and obligations
the taxpayers have created in private law. Thus, the legal form and substance of the
transactions are controlling. In other words, in ordinary business and commercial transactions, economic substance is consistent with legal substance. In tax
shelters and other structures that are designed solely to achieve tax savings, legal
substance and economic substance are divorced.
The “legal substance” of a transaction is primarily a legal question. In Continental Bank of Canada et al. v. The Queen,75 Bowman J (as he then was) held that the
requirement to consider “substance over form” in income tax law does not mean
that the legal effect of a transaction is irrelevant, nor does it mean that one is entitled
to treat substance as synonymous with economic effect.76 Therefore, “legal substance” analysis involves a determination that arises from considering the legal
formulation adopted by the taxpayer for an event and the evidence as to whether
the taxpayer acted or behaved in a fashion consistent with the rights and obligations formulated in the documentation.
73 Supra note 2, paragraph 56.
74 David Laro, “Economic Substance: A View from the Tax Court” (2000) vol. 52, no. 1 The Tax
Executive 44-48, at 45.
75 94 DTC 1858; [1995] 1 CTC 2135 (TCC).
76 Bowman J’s decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada: Continental Bank Leasing
Corporation v. The Queen et al., 98 DTC 6505; [1998] 4 CTC 119.
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An economic substance analysis goes a step further. In addition to finding out
what has happened in accordance with the legal formulation, the taxpayer’s transaction must be assessed “with an eye to commercial and economic realities.”77 For
example, in a situation similar to that in Canada Trustco, in addition to determining
whether the legal arrangements are effective and executed as planned, the court
would look at whether the economic position of the taxpayer (other than tax
savings) would be altered as a result of the transactions.
If the economic substance is clearly different from the legal substance, the former
should be the basis for determining the tax consequences. In many GAAR cases, the
taxpayer’s aim was to create a tax benefit in the form of a loss, expense, or exclusion
from gross income that has no economic corollary but is simply the consequence of
taking advantage of the tax rules. Other than the transaction costs, the taxpayer
really had little to lose.

Meaning of “Economic Substance”
In Evans v. The Queen, Bowman CJ attempted to define the term “economic
substance” as follows:
By economic substance I do not intend to import into this criterion a business
purpose test. The Supreme Court of Canada did not do so. Rather, I think what was
meant was that a genuine change in legal and economic relations took place as the
result of the transactions.78

This interpretation of economic substance is unclear. First of all, it fails to
clarify why business purpose is not imported into the economic substance inquiry.
Presumably Bowman CJ appreciated the fact that subsection 245(3) already codifies
the “business purpose” or “bona fide purposes” test, so that it is unnecessary to
incorporate this test in the economic substance inquiry for the purpose of subsection 245(4). As a general concept, however, it would make sense to examine both
the non-tax-purpose/motive and the non-tax-profit/outcome of transactions.79
77 Bronfman Trust, supra note 39, at 5067; 128, quoted in The Queen v. Singleton, 2001 DTC 5533;
[2002] 1 CTC 121, at paragraph 51 (SCC) (per LeBel J).
78 Evans, supra note 15, at paragraph 35.
79 The US courts have developed a “two-prong test” for determining whether a transaction lacks
economic substance: the objective prong looks at whether the taxpayer has shown that the
transaction had economic substance beyond the creation of tax benefits; and the subjective prong
looks at whether the taxpayer has shown that it had a business purpose for engaging in the
transaction other than tax avoidance. This article is not intended to provide a comprehensive
review of the US jurisprudence and literature on economic substance. For some interesting
work on this subject, see Marvin A. Chirelstein and Lawrence A. Zelenak, “Tax Shelters and
the Search for a Silver Bullet” (2005) vol. 105, no. 6 Columbia Law Review 1939-66; Hariton,
supra note 53; Isenbergh, supra note 53; Yoram Keinan, “The Many Faces of the Economic
Substance’s Two-Prong Test: Time for Reconciliation?” (2005) vol. 1, no. 2 New York University
Journal of Law and Business 371-456; Allen D. Madison, “The Tension Between Textualism and
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With respect to the determination of economic substance, the inquiry should
emphasize the economic result and outcome, as well as the “economic relations.”
If the taxpayer’s economic position was not meaningfully altered by the transaction,
or if there was no real economic reason for the transaction (other than tax-saving
considerations), it is difficult to find economic substance in the transaction. Therefore, a transaction lacks economic substance if “the financial position of the taxpayer
is unaffected (save for the costs of devising and implementing the arrangement).”80
In other words, a transaction lacks economic substance if did not expose the
taxpayer to any economic risk, or offer the taxpayer any opportunity for profit, that
was meaningful in relation to the resulting tax benefit. All in all, a transaction has
no economic substance if it was simply a “game,” as described by Lord Templeman
in the UK Ramsay case:
The game is recognisable by four rules. First, the play is devised and scripted prior to
the performance. Secondly, real money and real documents are circulated and exchanged. Thirdly, the money is returned by the end of the performance. Fourthly, the
financial position of the actors is the same at the end as it was in the beginning save
that the taxpayer in the course of the performance pays the hired actors for their
services. The object of the performance is to create the illusion that something has
happened, that Hamlet has been killed and that Bottom did don an asses head so that
tax advantage can be claimed as if something had happened.81

Leaving aside the definitional issue, Bowman CJ’s economic analysis in the
Evans case is problematic. Without much analysis, he found that the series of
transactions designed to “put the corporate funds in Dr. Evans’ hands” (that is,
surplus-stripping transactions) did not lack economic substance.82 His approach
was not much different from the traditional legal substance analysis. He did not
examine any economic evidence. Instead, he seemed to infer economic substance
from the legally effective arrangements:
The transactions do not lack economic substance. The transactions were real and
legally effective. They are not shams.”83

A transaction that is legally effective and not a sham in a legal sense may nevertheless be an economic or a substantive sham. Only an economic analysis can establish

Substance-Over-Form Doctrines in Tax Law” (2003) vol. 43, no. 3 Santa Clara Law Review
699-750; Patton, supra note 53; Larry R. Scott, “Sale-Leaseback v. Mere Financing: Lyon’s
Roar and the Aftermath” [1982] no. 4 University of Illinois Law Review 1075-1104; Smith, supra
note 59; and Alvin C. Warren Jr., “The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated
Transactions” (1981) vol. 59, no. 12 Taxes: The Tax Magazine 985-92, at 989.
80 CIR v. Challenge Corporation Ltd., [1987] 1 AC 155, at 168 (PC) (per Lord Templeman).
81 W.T. Ramsay v. IRC, [1979] 3 All ER 213, at 214-15 (CA).
82 Evans, supra note 15, at paragraph 22.
83 Ibid., at paragraph 35.
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the economic substance of the transaction. As noted by Bowman CJ, in the Evans
case the sole purpose of the transactions was to put the corporate funds in Dr. Evans’s
hands (a transaction that is normally characterized as a distribution of corporate
income, which is taxable as a dividend). The series of transactions was designed to
effect the transfer of funds at the least tax cost, by skilfully avoiding the literal
application of various anti-surplus-stripping provisions of the Act. It is clear that
the only economic benefit arising from the transactions was tax savings.

WHAT ARE THE RELEVANT FACTORS IN
D E T E R M I N I N G E C O N O M I C S U B S TA N C E ?
The Supreme Court correctly observed that the line between abusive tax avoidance
and legitimate tax planning “is far from bright.”84 In this part of the article, I argue
that the line can be made much brighter through an economic substance analysis,
for two reasons. First, the standard of inquiry is the “reasonable person” or “prudent investor” test. Subsection 245(4) specifically refers to the reasonable standard.
In other words, the economic substance determination is not a subjective reconstruction of the taxpayer’s transactions. Second, the inquiry is based on objective
economic factors that are the typical hallmarks of market-based transactions—
expected pre-tax (or non-tax) profit, risk, and tax-indifferent parties or intermediaries—each of which is discussed below.
Pre-Tax Profit
The pursuit of profit is a key feature of any business. A transaction has economic
substance if it provides an economic benefit of some consequence to the taxpayer
separate and apart from tax savings. In tax shelter cases, the crucial question is how
much profit is enough; obviously, a dollar’s worth of economic profit is insufficient.85 Another question is how to measure pre-tax profit. Unfortunately, there is
no clear answer to this question, even in the United States, where the jurisprudence
on the economic substance doctrine is most fully developed. It is not that the US
courts have come out differently on the question; rather, no tax shelter case has yet
involved any positive return, once transaction costs are taken into consideration.86
However, the US jurisprudence can provide some guidance on the application of

84 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 16.
85 Warren, supra note 79, at 989.
86 Joseph Bankman, “The Economic Substance Doctrine” (2000) vol. 74, no. 1 Southern California
Law Review 5-30, at 23. With respect to the measurement of pre-tax profit, US proposed rules
that were intended to codify the economic substance doctrine suggested the use of at least a
risk-free rate of return (proposed section 7701(n)(1)(B) of the Jumpstart Our Business Strength
( JOBS) Act, S 1637, 108th Cong., 1st sess., November 7, 2003). The rationale for this test is
that the taxpayer has placed some of its money at risk. In many of the tax shelter cases in the
United States, the taxpayer not only had negative returns after transaction costs, but had also
hedged away the possibility of any upside or downside risk.
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economic substance analysis in cases involving tax-avoidance transactions not unlike those in Mathew and Canada Trustco.
Long Term Capital Holdings87 is one of the more recent US tax-avoidance cases in
which economic substance has been considered.88 It is rather ironic that an arrangement designed by the renowned economist and Nobel prize winner Myron S.
Scholes was found to lack economic substance. The essence of the arrangement
was to allow loss duplication through the contribution of preferred stock with a
built-in loss to a partnership, the sale of the contributor’s partnership interest to
the general partner, and the subsequent sale of the loss stock by the partnership.
The transactions involving the taxpayer, Long Term Capital Holdings (“Long
Term”), included the following:
■

■

■

■

In 1996, Onslow Trading and Commercial LLC (“OTC”) transferred the
preferred stock to Long Term Capital Partners LP (“LTCP”), a hedge fund, in
exchange for a partnership interest in LTCP. OTC borrowed the cash component of its contribution from Long Term Capital Management UK (“LTCM”),
a UK entity related to LTCP. OTC also purchased from LTCM a put option
with respect to its interest in LTCP.
LTCP in turn contributed the preferred stock to a lower-tier partnership
called Portfolio. Both LTCP and Portfolio claimed that OTC’s $107 million
basis in the stock carried over to them in a tax-free transaction (by virtue of
section 721 of the Internal Revenue Code).
At the end of 1997, Portfolio sold the preferred stock to an investment bank
(“B&B”) for approximately $1 million, producing a loss of $106 million.
Portfolio allocated the capital loss to LTCP, which then allocated the loss to
LTCM.

The arranger of this deal received a partnership interest in LTCP and a consulting
fee of $1.2 million. Another consultant earned a fee of $1.8 million. LTCM earned fees
for assets under management, proportional to the return achieved for the investors.
The taxpayer, Long Term, relied on the additional fees it would earn from both
OTC and sufficient investment in B&B to justify its ability to earn a pre-tax return.
The US District Court for the District of Connecticut held that OTC’s contribution of the preferred stock to LTCP, OTC’s sale of its partnership interest to LTCM,
and Portfolio’s subsequent sale of the preferred stock to B&B lacked economic
substance and must be disregarded for federal income tax purposes. In the alternative, the court held that the transactions must be recast under the step transaction
87 Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, at 139 (D. Conn. 2004); aff ’d.
2005 US App. Lexis 20988 (2d Cir. 2005).
88 In US tax law, a transaction lacks economic substance if it “can not with reason be said to have
purpose, substance, or utility apart from [its] anticipated tax consequence”: Goldstein v. CIR,
364 F. 2d 734, at 740 (2d Cir. 1966). Transactions or arrangements may be disregarded if they
lack economic substance: see Compaq Computer Corp., 113 TC 214, at 224 (1999).
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doctrine as a taxable sale by OTC directly to LTCM. The court also upheld a 40 percent
penalty for gross valuation misstatement.
With respect to the objective economic substance test, the taxpayer argued that
the test ought to be whether there was a meaningful change in the taxpayer’s
economic position. The court rejected this argument and held that “[t]he test
should be whether there was a ‘reasonable opportunity for economic profit, that is,
profit exclusive of tax benefits.’ ”89 The court applied a cost-benefit analysis and
held that it was not reasonable for the taxpayer to expect a non-tax-based profit
from the transactions, given the hefty transactional costs incurred. The court compared the potential profit with the sizable amounts paid as attorney fees, consultant
fees, partnership distributions, bonuses, and related-party loans. In establishing the
potential profit, the court generously assumed LTCP’s above-market returns (which
the hedge fund was known for), but excluded certain management fees (including
only the management fees that LTCM could earn on the OTC investment) and
ignored the economic value of partner relationships. This cost-benefit analysis led
the court to conclude that the transaction lacked economic substance simply because no prudent investor would knowingly and intentionally incur costs above a
reasonable gain.
The taxpayer, Long Term, argued that it was motivated to enter into the OTC
transaction primarily by the management fees it could earn from OTC and the return
on its B&B investment. Long Term also stressed that accepting investments was its
core business. The court was not persuaded:
As analyzed above, the evidence of claimed reasonableness of the purported primary
motivation, fees, is unpersuasive—a prudent investor would not have made the deal.
The absence of reasonableness sheds light on Long Term’s subjective motivation,
particularly given the high level of sophistication possessed by Long Term’s principals
in matters economic. This is demonstrated, for example, by Scholes’ concession that
some of Long Term’s principals viewed the added value of OTC and B&B solely to be
anticipated tax benefits. Moreover, the construction of an elaborate, time consuming,
inefficient and expensive transactions with OTC for the purported purpose of generating fees itself points to Long Term’s true motivation, tax avoidance.90

The Long Term Capital Holdings case is similar to Mathew in that the loss was
“transferred” to the partnership and the amount of tax savings vastly exceeded any
pre-tax return on the investment. Two older cases, Rice’s Toyota World, Inc.91 and
Frank Lyon Co.,92 dealt with the application of economic substance analysis in
considering pre-tax profit with respect to sale and leaseback transactions.

89 Supra note 87, at 139 (D. Conn.).
90 Ibid., at 186.
91 81 TC 184 (1983); aff ’d. in part, rev’d. in part, 752 F. 2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
92 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 US 561 (1978).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2078951

“economic substance”: legitimate tax minimization vs. abusive tax avoidance

■

49

In Rice’s Toyota World, Inc., the taxpayer purchased a used computer through a
credit arrangement with a leasing company consisting of approximately 80 percent
non-recourse and 20 percent full recourse debt. After purchasing the computer, the
taxpayer leased it back to the leasing company. The US courts found that the transaction lacked economic substance because the taxpayer could not realize any economic
value from the transaction. The finding rested on the taxpayer’s failure to determine that the residual value in the computer was sufficient to generate a profit.
In Frank Lyon Co., the US Supreme Court held that the sale-leaseback transaction
had economic substance. In this case, the taxpayer (Lyon) borrowed $7.1 million,
bought a building from a bank for $7.6 million (the loan plus $500,000 of the taxpayer’s own funds), and leased the building back to a bank for rent equal to the
taxpayer’s payments of principal and interest on the $7.1 million loan. The initial
term of the lease was 25 years, with options to extend it up to a maximum of 65 years.
The lease agreement also provided the taxpayer with a fixed rate of return on its
$500,000 investment. At the end of the lease term, the bank could either acquire
the building or extend the lease. The taxpayer claimed depreciation deductions
from building and interest deductions on the loan, and reported the payments
from the bank as income from rent. The US Supreme Court stated:
In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction
with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory
realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by
tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should
honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.93

Had the Supreme Court of Canada engaged in an economic analysis of the
transaction in Canada Trustco, it would have considered whether the predetermined
rate of leasing fees (which was fixed at the interest rate plus 1 percent) could possibly
have produced a pre-tax profit for the taxpayer. On the basis of the facts described
in the case, this rate did not take into account the principal of the loan from the
bank (as in Frank Lyon Co.) or the residual value of the leased property (as in Rice’s
Toyota World, Inc.). It is difficult to imagine that Canada Trustco would have earned
any pre-tax profit, considering the huge amount of the CCA deduction ($31,196,700
for the 1997 taxation year), interest expense deduction, and the transaction costs
(including fees paid to the arranger of the transactions).
Related to the pre-tax profit factor is the comparison of pre-tax profit with the
amount of tax savings. A transaction generally lacks economic substance unless

93 Ibid., at 583-84. This decision has been criticized for overlooking the point that the regulatory
considerations that outweighed taking into account Lyon’s limited economic stake were those
of the bank, not of Lyon. Lyon’s real reward was the value of the tax attributes—deductions for
depreciation and interest. In return for those, it was willing to give up any pre-tax profit. See
Charles I. Kingson, “How Tax Thinks” (2004) vol. 37, no. 4 Suffolk University Law Review
1031-40, at 1039.
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the pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the net tax
benefits. In Mathew, the Supreme Court noted that the taxpayers deducted losses
exceeding $10 million, while their cost of investment was about $1.5 million; however, the court’s decision did not rest on this fact.94

Risk and Market Forces
If there is no real possibility that the taxpayer will gain or lose, or if all the risks—
indeed, the type of risks that are encountered daily in real business transactions—
have been hedged, then it is likely that there is no economic substance to the
transaction. To put it slightly differently, a transaction lacks real economic substance
if the transactions and steps are so “pre-wired” or so certain to occur that there are
no real market forces at work. The occurrence or timing of any of the steps is a
function of anything other than planning. There are no supervening market forces
or other non-tax considerations that could disrupt the scheduled execution of the
planned steps. Naturally, wise business planning necessitates careful identification
and consideration of possible risks. One should expect that sophisticated financial
officers will anticipate future events and plan for them. However, if the planning
virtually eliminates the market risk normally present in business transactions, one
may rightly become suspicious that the deal lacks economic substance other than
the tax benefits.
When examined in the light of risk and market forces, it is obvious that the
transaction in Canada Trustco had no economic substance. The transactions were
preordained; the loan from the bank was effectively repaid in its entirety on the day
it was made when Canada Trustco assigned the rent payments; there was no risk
that the rent payments would not be made, because the funds came originally from
Canada Trustco; and Canada Trustco’s own contribution to the deal and its transaction costs ($5.9 million in fees) were fully covered by the bond.95
Indifferent Parties and Intermediaries
The fact that a transaction was designed by an arranger or involves a tax-indifferent
party or special-purpose entity is a relevant factor in determining economic substance. As Lord Diplock observed in IRC v. Burmah,

94 In OSFC Holdings Ltd., supra note 30, at paragraph 51, Rothstein JA held that the significant
disparity between the potential tax benefit to the taxpayer of about $52 million and expected
returns from the operation and disposition of the STIL II portfolio showed that the taxpayer’s
acquisition of Standard Trust’s 99 percent interest in the STIL II partnership was not
undertaken primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit.
95 The Supreme Court held against the minister on the ground that “cost” for the purposes of the
CCA provisions did not mean “at risk amount.” However, the court did not find that the
$120 million was at any economic risk. In this respect, the minister’s submission succinctly
described the risk-free character of the transaction. Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 70.
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[t]he kinds of tax-avoidance schemes that have occupied the attention of the courts in
recent years . . . involve inter-connected transactions between artificial persons, limited companies, without minds of their own but directed by a single master-mind.96

Therefore, the involvement of a tax-indifferent intermediary may raise the suspicion
that the sole function of the intermediary is to serve the interest of tax avoidance.
In Canada Trustco, the deal was designed and sold to the taxpayer by an arranger
(Macquarie Corporate Finance (USA) Inc.). The original owner of the trailers (TLI) was
indifferent to the tax treatment of Canada Trustco and seemed a willing participant
for a fee of over $3.6 million. MAIL was a special-purpose entity established to facilitate
the transactions. In Evans, all the parties involved were controlled by Dr. Evans’s
family, including his wife and children. Indifferent parties have been used in other
transactions attacked under the GAAR.97

Ordinary Business Transactions
None of the above factors is conclusive. The determination of economic substance
should be made on the basis of all of the relevant factors.
At one end of the spectrum, a transaction has all the usual commercial features
and is clearly an “ordinary business transaction” with economic substance. The
GAAR is not intended to interfere with legitimate business transactions, even when
they are tax-motivated. It does not take away the taxpayer’s right to tax planning in
order to take advantage of certain loopholes that naturally present themselves in the
course of business operations.
At the other end of the spectrum, if a transaction is designed to produce a loss
(that is, the pre-tax profit is less than the transaction costs), or even to produce pretax losses, and no independent business person would enter into the transaction
without the tax benefit, the transaction will lack economic substance. This is
typically referred to as a “tax shelter.” The economic substance analysis is most
effective when it is applied to tax shelters and other closed investments where the
taxpayer is not already engaged in the particular subject of the investment and
stands to profit (if at all) only from the particular investment. An example would be
a case where a taxpayer structured its investment to generate a loss that would
serve to offset the tax on completely unrelated income and the transaction gave rise
to a loss that dwarfed the business objectives of the taxpayer and any profits arising
from them. These are the so-called loss generators (for example, the transactions in
Long Term Capital Holdings).98 “An economic substance case that involves a publicly

96 [1982] STC 30, at 32 (HL).
97 For example, McNichol et al. v. The Queen, 97 DTC 111; [1997] 2 CTC 2088 (TCC); Water’s
Edge Village Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. The Queen, 2002 DTC 7172; [2002] 4 CTC 1 (FCA); and
RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc. et al. v. The Queen, 97 DTC 302; [1998] 1 CTC 2300 (TCC).
98 For a review of these cases, see Bankman, supra note 86, at 21; and Keinan, supra note 79.
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marketed shelter and a billion dollar price tag is hard to defend as taxpayer’s
counsel—on that most tax lawyers would agree.”99
In between typical ordinary business transactions and tax shelters, there is a
range of transactions with mixed tax and non-tax motives and substance. As in other
areas of tax law, the courts must examine all the relevant facts and circumstances
and determine the predominant motive and outcome of the transaction. For example, in UPS v. Commissioner,100 a purely tax-motivated transaction was upheld. In this
case, the taxpayer was engaged in the exceedingly profitable business of selling
parcel insurance. The premiums collected in exchange for providing such insurance are taxable income. In order to minimize its tax on the insurance profit, UPS
restructured its insurance program by insuring the risks with an unrelated insurer;
as a result, UPS paid the entire premiums over to the insurer and deducted the
payment as an expense. The unrelated insurer reinsured the risk with a Bermuda
company that had been formed by UPS, which then distributed the profits to UPS
shareholders. As a result, the insurance premiums that UPS had previously reported
in its income were being reported by an offshore insurance company that was
owned by UPS shareholders. The Eleventh Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeal
held that restructuring should be respected for tax purposes. The court found that
there were necessary “economic effects” because UPS was obliged to pay the unrelated insurer and the insurer could proceed against UPS if the insurer defaulted.
The insurer also bore the risk of default by the Bermuda company on its obligations under the reinsurance agreement. The court held that the restructuring had
the necessary business purpose because “when we are talking about a going concern like UPS,” the transaction has a business purpose “as long as it figures in a
bona fide, profit-seeking business.”101

H O W C A N T H E C O U R T S A P P LY A N E C O N O M I C
S U B S TA N C E A N A LY S I S I N G A A R C A S E S ?
Having discussed why an economic substance analysis is important to the application of the GAAR, what economic substance means, and how economic substance
can be determined, I will now turn to the question of how the courts can incorporate an economic substance analysis in their GAAR decisions. This part of the article
focuses on three issues:
1. At which stage of the GAAR analysis should the courts consider the economic substance of transactions?
2. What are the types of provisions that make it imperative for the courts to
examine economic substance?
3. Where do the courts find their precedents?
99 Bankman, supra note 86, at 22.
100 254 F. 3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001).
101 Ibid., at 1019.
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Economic Substance Analysis Under Subsection 245(4)
The Supreme Court seemed to allow the application of an economic substance
analysis at various stages of the GAAR analysis. As discussed above, however, because recharacterization of taxpayer’s transactions is generally prohibited unless
subsection 245(4) applies, the economic substance analysis is most important to the
determination of abuse within the meaning of that provision.
Whether a transaction lacking economic substance constitutes an abusive transaction under subsection 245(4) is controlled by the legislative purpose and intent
of the provisions of the Act. As a general proposition, unless the relevant provisions of the Act are intended to permit the enjoyment of a tax benefit resulting
from a transaction that lacks economic substance, such a transaction should be
presumed to be abusive. In contrast, a transaction that is clearly supported by the
text, intent, and purpose of the statute will withstand the GAAR whether or not it
otherwise meets the economic substance test.102
For example, the transaction in Mathew clearly lacked any economic substance.
The partners of partnership B paid about $1.5 million to acquire interests in the
partnership in order to gain access to the tax losses, but they deducted losses of
over $10 million.103 Other than the tax savings, there was no evidence of any
significant return on their investment. However, the investment was “profitable”
when the value of the loss deduction was taken into account. Allowing the taxpayer
to succeed in Mathew would amount to allowing taxpayers to intentionally expend
far more than could reasonably be expected to be recouped through non-tax
economic returns in a transaction whose sole motivation is tax avoidance. That
would clearly defeat the purpose of the GAAR.
Ultimately, whether or not the GAAR is applicable in a given situation is a
question of statutory interpretation. Ambiguities are inherent to the exercise of
statutory interpretation. Litigation, especially before the Supreme Court, often
involves interpretative issues that are not very clear. Ambiguity may arise from
different approaches to statutory interpretation. A liberal, purposive interpretation
may reveal a broader purpose that requires the transaction to have real economic
substance, while a literal interpretation of the specific provisions may not impose
the same requirement. Ambiguity may also arise where the provisions of the Act
read as a whole may not reveal any coherent policy or purpose, but rather contain a
number of anomalous and inconsistent ad hoc measures adopted in response to
particular cases, budget initiatives, immediate revenue needs, or lobbying by specialinterest groups. The Supreme Court made it clear that in such cases a finding of
abuse is warranted only where it cannot reasonably be concluded that the avoidance

102 Bankman, supra note 86, at 11.
103 The appellants in this case deducted over $10 million of the losses against their own incomes.
Some of appellants, in addition to reducing their taxable income for the relevant year to nil,
also generated a non-capital loss to be carried over to other years.
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transaction was consistent with the object, spirit, or purpose of the provisions of
the Act. “[T]he abusive nature of the transaction must be clear.”104

Types of Tax Provisions Requiring Economic Substance
While it may be helpful to conduct an economic analysis in all cases, this analysis is
particularly relevant to statutory provisions that contain terms or concepts that
draw their meaning from commercial life. In interpreting these provisions, the
ultimate question is what it is that taxpayers have actually done. Because it is often
not possible to define a transaction or a concept with enough specificity, Parliament
may simply use a common commercial term instead of enumerating the requirements that a taxpayer must meet in order to receive a tax deduction or other
benefits. When a taxpayer claims a benefit under this type of statutory provision,
the courts should define the term by referring to “[l]ife in all its fullness”105 because
“that is where the term originated.”106
Lord Hoffmann has described the proper approach to statutory interpretation
in the following terms:
If the statute required something which had a real commercial existence, like a profit
or loss, then a series of preordained transactions which taken together produced no
profit or loss would not satisfy the statute. On the other hand, if all that the statute
required was something which had a particular legal effect, like discharging a debt or
passing title to property, then a transaction which had that effect satisfied the statute
even it had no business purpose. 107

The distinction between terms of art and real terms is “not an unreasonable generalisation,” but it should not “provide a substitute for a close analysis of what the
statute means.”108 Indeed, that “would be the very negation of purposive construction.”109 The extent to which economic substance analysis is relevant in a GAAR
case depends on the court’s interpretation of the legislative purpose.
For example, on a broader interpretation, the purpose of the CCA provisions of
the Act is to provide “for the recognition of money spent to acquire qualifying
assets to the extent that they are consumed in the income-earning process,”110 or
even to recognize the true economic cost consumed in the income-producing process in order to obtain the “accurate picture” of profit. The broader interpretation

104 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 62.
105 Welch v. Helvering, 290 US 111, at 115 (1933).
106 Patton, supra note 53, at 515.
107 Leonard Hoffmann, “Tax Avoidance” [2005] no. 2 British Tax Review 197-206, at 203. See also
Lord Hoffmann’s comments in MacNiven v. Westmoreland Investments Ltd., [2003] 1 AC 311 (HL).
108 Barclays Finance Ltd. v. Mawson, [2005] 1 AC 684, at paragraph 38 (HL).
109 Ibid.
110 See the Tax Court decision in Canada Trustco, supra note 19, at paragraph 60.
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is more consistent with the general design of the Act: “provisions of the Income Tax
Act are intended to apply to transactions with real economic substance.”111 More
specifically, the deduction for CCA is relevant to the calculation of profit under
section 9. As the Supreme Court stated in Canderel Limited v. The Queen, the goal
of profit computation is “to obtain an accurate picture of the taxpayer’s profit for
the given year.”112 Whether the picture of a taxpayer’s profit is accurate or not is
measured against commercial reality (for example, financial accounting). In this
sense, interpreting the cost of depreciable property to be the amount on paper as
opposed to the amount in a real commercial sense would distort the picture of
profit. “Profit,” “loss,” and “cost” are perhaps typical terms used in the Act that
draw their meaning from commercial life. A broader interpretation of purpose will
thus require that the term “cost” be given a meaning that is based on the economic
substance of the transactions.

Precedents for Economic Substance Analysis in Tax Law
Bowman CJ recently remarked in XCO Investments Ltd. v. The Queen:
I am aware that economic reality is a concept that under recent jurisprudence is not in
favour. Nonetheless it is an important ingredient in a determination of what is
reasonable.113

In this recent GAAR case, the taxpayers entered into a series of transactions involving
the purchase of losses from an indifferent third party (Woodwards) in order to reduce
their taxes otherwise payable. After finding that the legal aspects of the arrangements
were effective, Bowman CJ examined the economic substance of the transaction.
The taxpayers incurred a cost of $557,556 in order to obtain the participation of
Woodwards in the arrangement. In return, the taxpayers saved (or would have saved,
if the plan had worked) the tax on $5,867,336 (which was estimated to be well over
$2 million). Without resorting to the GAAR, Bowman CJ denied the tax benefit to
the taxpayers by disallowing the allocation of partnership profits to Woodwards in
excess of its economic contribution pursuant to section 103 of the Act.
Bowman CJ noted that the term “reasonable” is a relative term and what is
reasonable must depend on all of the circumstances. The determination of “reasonableness” is clearly not a discretionary act on the part of the minister. The same
reasoning applies to the “economic substance” analysis. There is sufficient Canadian
jurisprudence on economic analysis or a facts-and-circumstances determination in
the context of statutory provisions imposing a “reasonable” test (for example,
paragraph 20(1)(c) and sections 67, 67.1, 69, and 247) or provisions that require the

111 Canada Trustco, supra note 2, at paragraph 49.
112 98 DTC 6100, at 6110; [1998] 2 CTC 35, at 55 (SCC).
113 2005 TCC 655, at paragraph 35.
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courts to adopt the substance-over-form approach (for example, paragraph 12(1)(g)
and subsections 16(1), 74.1(1) and (2), and 56(2)).
In addition, Canadian courts have often referred to foreign jurisprudence in
interpreting Canadian tax law. The Duke of Westminster is perhaps the most often
cited non-Canadian case in the area of statutory interpretation and tax avoidance.
There is no reason why an application of the GAAR that is intended to “attenuate”
the application of the Duke of Westminster principle cannot benefit from foreign
jurisprudence, especially that of the United States. The enactment of the GAAR can
be attributed, in part, to the Supreme Court’s rejection in Stubart of the business
purpose test and its derivative, the economic substance doctrine in the US case of
Gregory v. Helvering. Therefore, it is important for Canadian courts to be mindful
of US jurisprudence on economic substance, which is perhaps the most sophisticated in common-law jurisdictions.

CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have attempted to deal with the questions left unanswered by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Trustco and Mathew. The main argument is
that economic substance analysis is not only crucial to any meaningful application
of the GAAR, but also capable of objective determination and application. The test
for determining economic substance may vary, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, but this flexibility should not be confused with uncertainty and
unpredictability. Economic substance analysis offers the best standard for drawing
the line between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance. Most importantly, Canadian courts can draw from Canadian and foreign jurisprudence in
applying an economic substance analysis in tax cases.
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